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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT,

Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A.,

in its capacity as Administrator of the
Estate of Jacob R. Green, deceased,
and JACOB R. GREEN II original administrator of the estate of Jacob R.
Green I, deceased,

No.
10912

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for attorney's fees against the administrator and original administrator of the Estate of Jacob
R. Green I.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on
the ground that the merits of this case had been adjudicated
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by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, in the matter of the Estate of Jacob
R. Green I. The trial court ordered that the record in the
matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I be made a part of
the record in this case. The trial court denied defendantq'
motion to dismiss. The defendants' petition for an inter.
mediate appeal to the court was granted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants seek a reversal of the order denying
their motion to dismiss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Elwood Dennett appearing prose filed a complaint
(R-1-4) in which he alleges in substance as follows:
Jacob R. Green II as administrator of the estate of
Jacob R. Green I originally contracted with plaintiff for his
services as attorney. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. was
successor administrator and became bound to the original
administrator's obligations for plaintiff's attorney's fees.
The compensation the plaintiff was to receive "while not
discussed in terms of percentages, was to be a contingent
compensation, with nothing to be owed by the heirs in case
of an unsuccessful attempt, and with the plaintiff to recover
a reasonable percentage in case the plaintiff was successful
in achieving disallowance of the will and an intestacy probate." A fee of one-third of the estate would be reasonable
under the circumstances.
In plaintiff's complaint he prays for judgment against
the defendants as administrators of the estate of .Jacob R.
Green I in the amount of $6,750.00 for extraordinary serv-
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ices rendered, together with $970.00 usual probate fee
awarded for the services rendered by decree of the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, in the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I.
The defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
upon the grounds of failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, res judicata and collateral estoppel.
(R-5-9)

In support of defendants' motion, defendants caused the
record in the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I to be
made a part of the record in this case. (R-10)
In the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I there
was a contest between the defendants and the plaintiff concerning the amount of plaintiff's fees. In a petition by the
plaintiff for allowance of extraordinary fees to the District
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the plaintiff, pro se, asserted a claim
the same as he, pro se, asserts in the complaint in the case
at bar (R130-132). At hearings on his petition for attorney's
lees he said :
"The petition, that is myself acting in this capacity as a petitioner, rests." (R-181)
The defendant, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as
administrator of the estate of Jacob R. Green I, filed an
amended petition for third and final account including
therein an answer to the plaintiff's petition. That answer
1
'ontained an admission and denial of plaintiff's petition.
The defendant, First Security Bank, as administrator, alleged:
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"That the normal and usual fee for the services
rendered by counsel would be $970.00, that with re.
spect to this amount, the administrator acknowled ,
the estate's liability . . .
ges

x
"That certain extraordinary services were rendered by the estate's counsel, the extent and value of
which are not entirely known to the administrator
and with respect to which the court should make ~
determination which would be fair and equitable to
both counsel and the heirs of the estate. A separatk
petition has been filed by counsel detailing the services he claims." (R-135-136)
At the hearings on the petition of John Elwood Dennett
and answer of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. as administrator, the defendant, Jacob R. Green II was present.
(R-154 & 157). The plaintiff testified in support of the
allegations he made in his verified petition. (R-158-176)
Mr. Dennett called an expert witness to support his petition.
He was Mr. Richard Bird, Jr., Esq. whose firm subsequently
appeared at a hearing as Mr. Dennett's attorneys. (R-176 &
185) The defendant, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as
administrator appeared through its trust officer, Mr. Brent
Hortin. (R-154) Jacob R. Green II appeared and objected to
Mr. Dennett's claim (R-157) and consented to the court'~
hearing the issue of Mr. Dennett's attorney's fees. (R-183)
All of the parties in the case at bar were present at the
hearings on Mr. Dennett's petition for attorney's fees in the
matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I. All of the parties

p

5
submitted to the jurisdiction of that court for the adjudication of reasonable attorney's fees. (R-183)
The court, Judge Bryant H. Croft presiding, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a decree.
(R-149-151) The plaintiff was awarded a regular fee of
$970.00 and extraordinary fee of $985.00. (R-150)
At the last hearing on the petition of the plaintiff concerning attorney's fees Mr. William D. Oswald, Esq. of the
same firm as Mr. Richard Bird, Jr. appeared as one of Mr.
Dennett's attorneys.

Mr. Dennett's attorney represented to the court:
" ... It is my understanding in my conversation
with him (Mr. Dennett) he discussed with you (the
Judge) the possibility of changing your finding to
show that the attorneys fee allowed Mr. Dennett will
be changed to show that they were allowed to the administrator of the estate. And now it's our feeling
that our best course would be to appeal to the Supreme Court without changing any of the findings .
. . . (W) e do not wish to make any change in the
findings or decree." (R-185)
The court responded (R-185) :
"Oh, that's fine. I would like to make a statement into the record so that there will be something
for your guidance as well as that of the Supreme
Court and in regards to the ruling I made concerning the allowance of attorneys fees in this case.
"There were two aspects of the case that formed
a basis for the allowance of the attorney's fee. One
was the fact that some work was done in the State of
Iowa to recover a portion of the estate of the decedent that was in that state for the heirs. It's my
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understanding that the - as a consequence of the
efforts to some extent of Mr. Dennett, to some extent
of the First Security Bank as administrator of th
estate of Jacob R. Green in Utah, and largely throug~
the efforts of Attorney Ed Dailey in Iowa, they were
able to effect a settlement there and recover for the
heirs an estate that was not left to the heirs of some
$6,935.85. They paid to Attorney Ed Dailey the sum
of $1,000.00 attorney's fee, so that it would appear
that the recovery through the action in Iowa totaled
$7,935.85 counting the $1,000.00 attorney's fee that
was paid to Ed Dailey.
"Now the issue there as here, to a lesser degree,
was the competency of Jacob R. Green to make the
will, he having been declared an incompetent by the
court in Salt Lake County, this court, long before he
made the wills involved. At the time he made the
wills involved, he was the ward of a guardian under
a guardianship proceeding in this court, and consequently when he moved to Iowa, after having been
declared an incompetent by this court, where he died,
they attempted to probate a will that he had executed
after he had been declared mentally incompetent.
"In a negotiated settlement, I believe between
Mr. Dailey and the attorneys for the administrator
in Iowa, the heirs received, as I indicated, some
$6,935.85 in assets, and Dailey was paid a Thousand
Dollars. Now just how much work Mr. Dennett did
on that case, I'm not sure. In his testimony, and his
testimony was very general in nature, he spoke of
many hours of work and nothing really to support it
The bank, as a matter of fact, did a lot of the negotiations with Ed Dailey in Iowa as the administrator
out here. Be that as it may, in fixing a fee, I vi ewe~
the Iowa recovery as, in effect, an accomplishment of
recovering something like you might in a judgment,
and so I computed Mr. Dennett's fee on the basis of
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twenty-five per cent of the amount the heirs in Utah
received from the Iowa estate plus a Thousand Dollars paid to Mr. Dailey to come up with an attorney's
fee of $1,984.00. And from that, of course, I deducted
the $1,000.00 paid Dailey leaving Mr. Dennett
$984.00 of the fee.
"Now what that is, of course, is a twenty-five
per cent fee on the recovery divided between two
attorneys, Mr. Dailey doing most of the work in
Iowa, and Mr. Dennett doing some part of the work
here in Utah.
"Now with respect to the estate in Utah, the fee
I allowed Mr. Dennett here based upon an estate that
is slightly less than $20,000.00 was the standard fee
fixed by the State Bar Association for an estate of
this size. And the reason I didn't allow any additional
extraordinary fee on the Utah estate was because
from my review of the file it was apparent to me that
there wasn't any extraordinary effort required in
probating the estate. There was a petition filed to
have the will declared void because Green was incompetent at the time he executed it, and the court
entered a default judgment because the Iowa administrator didn't make an appearance when the time
was set for trial and declared the will invalid. Well,
I don't view that particular effort on the part of Mr.
Dennett as being a great extraordinary service because he merely had to file a petition asking that the
will be declared void because Green was incompetent
when he executed it as declared by this court. And,
of course, that was the decree that this court entered.
When I say, 'this court,' I don't mean me. I mean the
District Court of Salt ake County entering-declaring the will of Jacob R. Green void because he was,
in fact, incompetent and under a guardianship of this
court at the time he executed the will.

lI
I

I
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"Now under the circumstances, I don't see th t
the ac~ievem_ent, _if it can be c~lled an achievemen~,
of havmg this will declared void by this court wa~
one that required any extraordinary services on th:
part of Mr. Dennett.
"The petition for the probate of the estate in
Utah was filed on November 14, 1961. He filed a
petition on behalf of Jacob R. Green II asking that
Jacob R. Green be appointed administrator of the
estate here. The administrator of the estate in the
Iowa court in Des Moines had, in fact, filed an
Answer to this petition.
"On April 13, 1962, Judge Van Cott signed an
Order directing that the trial of the issues of the
estate in Utah be held on April 24, 1962, and that a
copy of this order be served on the attorney for the
estate in Iowa, the Answer filed by the Iowa administrator having asked for ancillary proceedings in
Utah. Of course, the Iowa administrator did not appear on April 24th, and the court appointed Jacob R.
Green, II the administrator of the estate here. ThiR
order was finally presented to Judge Van Cott for
signature on July 27, 1962.
On January 23, 1963, the bank filed a consent to
serve as a substitute administrator, and the bank was
appointed substitute administrator pursuant to r,
petition filed by Mr. Dennett on behalf of the estate.
At least, I assume it was filed by Mr. Dennett. His
signature doesn't appear upon it, but it is signed by
Jacob R. Green.
"Now a Petition for First and Final Accounting, Petition for Approval of Administration, for
Ratification of Disbursement and Acts, and for R~
lease and Discharge as Administrator was f~!,ed
March 21, 1963 and prepared by Mr. Dennett, • ru
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sure. It's a one-page petition with a typewritten
schedule attached.
"There was an Order signed approving that account by Judge Hansen on April 8, 1963. A Notice to
Creditors was not published until May 17, 1963, the
last date of publication being June 7, 1963, and I believe that was published at the - through the effort
of the administrator.
"It's my understanding from Mr. Hortin at the
bank that the inventory and appraisement was prepared by the bank when filed October 31, 1963, about
two years after the original petition was filed.
"There was a subsequent Petition for First Accounting Approval and for Leave to Make Partial
Distribution filed November 30, 1965. A Decree of
Partial Distribution was entered December 21, 1965.
"There is an Order signed granting Leave to
Contract with respect to Real Property that was
signed in May - May 26th of 1966. And then, of
course, the final amended Petition of the Administrator for Approval of Third and Final Account
which was originally prepared by Mr. Dennett and
which I, personally, almost rewrote myself and told
him what he would have to put in it before I would
approve it.
"I fail to see in this estate in Utah that there
was any great amount of work involved. It was a
simple estate for less than $20,000.00, had no complications whatsoever as far as I can see, and I
couldn't see any justification whatsoever for any
extraordinary fee in this estate.
"Now I don't know what Mr. Dennett may have
done - and I heard his testimony - and, again, with
respect to his activities here, it was very general. He
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talked in terms of many, many hours, but he didr,'t
have any records to back up what he was saying. A d
my review of the file, as far as I am concerned doll
not reflect a complicated case that justifies an ~xtr:~
ordinary fee. I don't think in any sense of the word
that he, in effect, recovered a $20,000.00 estate for
the heirs in Utah. We had $20,000.00 - a $20,000.00
estate left in Utah by Jacob Green subject to probate
here, which was probated in routine fashion albeit
drug out over more than a five-year period, or at
least a five-year period.
"Now after reviewing the file carefully and
hearing the bank, and the bank as administrator
testified, as I recall, at least there is something in the
record to indicate, that they had done a substantial
amount of the work required to get the inventory
ready and filed as well as efforts that were put forth
afterwards to get the estate closed. And I am not
convinced at all that this is an estate that required
any great amount of work over and above the routine
work required of any attorney in probate of an estate
of this size. And the fact that he has filed three accountings in this estate doesn't suggest to me that it
required a great effort on his part, but, rather, it was
a rather indifferent handling of the estate, because
I see nothing in the proceedings here at all that was
complicated or that required any five-year drag out
of getting the estate administered and closed.
"For those reasons, and I say to you, I reviewed
the file from cover to cover and outlined it making
notes, I came to the conclusion that the ordinary fee
allowable by the State Bar Schedule as far as the
Utah estate was concerned was all that he was entitled to.
"I might say that he was the attorney for the
guardian prior to the time that Jacob Green died for
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a brief period of time. I think for less than a year, at
least if my memory serves me.
"I reviewed the guardianship file also in connection with this case, and, of course, he was paid another fee for his work in the guardianship estate. So
all of the work he did prior to the death of Jacob
Green as attorney for the guardianship estate, I
think he was paid in that estate, and I think a substantial amount of the work that he did in the Jacob
Green matter involved work that he did as attorney
for the guardian rather than attorney for the estate.
"There was some complaint made when we had
the hearing here that heirs of Jacob Green made
many efforts to try and contact him. They would go
down to his office and rather than see them, he would
go out the back door and not see them. Well, he had
his explanation for it, but I don't see, in any sense of
the word, he is entitled to any extraordinary fee of
the estate probated in this court.
"Now I have taken the time to give you that information and the reason that was back of the allowance of the fee that I made in this case because otherwise I think the Supreme Court is in no position to
know what was back of the fee. Now I don't know
whether you would propose in taking this matter to
the Supreme Court to include what I have put into
the record today as my reasons for determining the
fee that I did or not, but I dare say that if you don't,
the bank will, and I think the Supreme Court is entitled to know the reasons why I came up with the
fee that I did in this case.
"Now if you have any questions, I will be glad
to answer them."
"MR. OSWALD: No, Your Honor."
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IN HIS COMPLAINT IS
RES JUD/CATA. THE DECREE OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ADJUDICAT.
ING THE AMOUNT OF FEE TO WHICH PLAIN.
TIFF WAS ENTITLED FOR HIS SERVICES TO DE.
FENDANTS IS CONCLUSIVE.
A review of the record for comparing the parties and
issues in the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I and in
the complaint on file in the case at bar reveals:
(a) Identical cause of action
(b) Identical persons and parties to the actions
(c) Identical persons for or against whom claims are
made
(d) Adjudication by the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, of
plaintiff's claim in the matter of the Estate oi
Jacob R. Green I prior to his filing the complaint
in the case at bar.
(e) Adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction
The enumerated elements of res judicata are clearly
contained within the record in the case at bar. The judicial
power and jurisdiction of the District Court to adjudicate
plaintiff's claim in the matter of the Estate of Jacob R.
Green I are not in doubt.
In a previous decision by this court, in re Agee's Estat··,
69 U. 130, 252 P. 891 (1927), the probate division of a Ut 8h
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District Court was found to have the same constitutionally
vested judicial power and jurisdiction as the other divisions,
if any, of a District Court. In that case an attorney for
the 8dministrator of an estate filed a petition with the
District Court's probate division as follows: to fix and allow
ccifain amounts as fees, to approve and allow certain costs
,,,1\:mced, to direct the administrator to pay forthwith to
the petitioner his fees for legal services rendered and to
impress a lien on certain amounts in favor of petitioner.
Th2 administrator filed a pleading in the nature of a demurrer which challenged the sufficiency of the attorney's
petition on the ground that the District Court's probate
division had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. The
District Court dismissed the petition of the attorney. This
court reversed and remanded with directions to the District
Court. The rationale of this court in that case squarely applies to the issues in the case at bar. It is the landmark Utah
ease roncerning these issues. This court said :
"Respondent makes the further contention that
appellant's cause of action, if any he has, is against
the administrator personally, and not against the
estate. Such, no doubt, is the rule in ordinary cases
of administration. Upon this point respondent's
counsel call our attention to many cases .
The
exceptions to the rule are also stated ... "
". . . we are convinced that this is a case in
which the fund is primarily liable for whatever
amount is reasonably due the appellant for his services, in its behalf, and that appellant is entitled to
maintain an action therefor against the administrator of the estate as such.
"This brings us to the last and perhaps most important question in the case. It is contended by re-
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spondent that the district court in a probate proce ding was without jurisdiction to hear and determ~ _
the cause.... Is the district court, in the exercise~~
probate powers, a court of competent jurisdiction? ·

* * * *

". . . we will quote another passage from
Woerner, vol. 2, p. 1185:
'In view of the ultimate liability of the estate for
the disbursements made in its behalf by the executor
or administrator, and of the duty incumbent upon
the probate court to pass upon the question of the
reasonableness of the charges, as well as of the Jia.
bility of the estate, it would seem that original juris.
diction to adjudicate between executors or administrators and their creditors for services in respect of
the estate should, on principle, be vested in the pro.
bate courts, to avoid circuity of action and unnecessary costs and delay, and there seems to be legislative
and judicial tendency in that direction, particularly
in the western states.'
"The cases cited sustain the text.
"The sections of the Probate Code referred to
are as follows :
'7872. [75-14-17] All issues of fact joined in probate and guardianship proceedings must be tried in
conformity with the requirements of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and in all such proceedings the
party affirming is the plaintiff, and the one denying
or avoiding is defendant. Judgments therein, on the
issue joined, as well as for costs, may be entered a~d
enforced by execution or otherwise by the court as m
civil actions.'
'7873. [75-14-18] If no jury is demanded t?e
court or judge must try the issues joined. If on writ-
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ten demand a jury is called by either party, and the
issues are not sufficiently made up by the written
pleadings on file, the court may direct the preparation of more specific pleadings, or, on due notice to
the opposite party, may settle and frame the issues to
be tried, and submit the same, together with the evidence of each party, to the jury. If the trial of the
issues joined requires the examination of an account,
the court or judge must try the matter or refer it,
and no jury can be called.'
"As further illustrating the powers of the court
in probate proceedings, we quote the following sec'7558. [75-1-6] The district and Supreme Courts
and the judges thereof sitting in probate and guardianship matters shall exercise all such powers, consistent with the provisions of this title, as are or may
be conferred upon those courts or judges, respectively, in other proceedings; and, except as otherwise
provided in this title, the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure shall be applicable to and constitute
the rules of practice in probate and guardianship
proceedings.'

* * * *
"In the Hazlett Case the syllabus is as follows:
'Attorneys, who under employment by executors
of a will, render necessary services beneficial to the
testator's estate in the settlement thereof, may, in a
proper case, file with the county court an itemized
bill for their compensation, and the county court has
authority to allow a reasonable amount for that purpose as a claim against the estate, where those in control of it refuse to pay the claim and object to any
allowance therefor.'
"In the state of Nebraska, under the Constitution and statutes of the state, the county court, in the
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settlement of estates of decedents, has the powers uf
a court of chancery. See Hazlett Case, page 591 189
Neb. 372). In this state the district court is a court
of general jurisdiction. It exercises probate powers
which, in most jurisdictions of the country, are exer'.
cied separately by another court. The jurisdiction of
our district courts is lucidly explained by Mr. Justici:
Frick in the case of Weyant v. Utah Sav. & Trust Co
54 Utah 181, 182 P.189 9 A.L.R. 1119. Counsel fo~
appellant quote from the opinion the following language, found on pages 203, 204 (182 P. 198).
'There is, however, no such court as a probate
court in this state. The only courts having generalwe may say universal-original jurisdiction are the
district courts, all of which are created by our Constitution. Upon those courts, in the language of article 8, section 7, of our Constitution, is conferred
"original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law." Neither the Constitution or the law8
of this state prohibit those courts from exercising
original jurisdiction to any extent. * * *
'The district courts of this state are therefore
invested with jurisdiction in probate matters precisely the same as they are invested with all other
civil and criminal jurisdiction. They transact probate
business as they do all other civil business. True, in
administering estates they follow the established law
and rules of procedure applicable to those matters,
the same as they follow the established law and rules
of procedure applicable to so-called equity or la\:
cases. Moreover, our Constitution provides thai
"there shall be but one form of action, and law and
equity may be administered in the same action." ~'e
therefore have ... courts possessed of general original jurisdiction, which are known as district courts.
The district courts of this state, therefore, admm·
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ister the estates of decedents as a part of their original jurisdiction, the same as they hear and enter
judgments on promissory notes, or enter decrees in
equity, foreclosing mortgages or quieting titles.'

* * *
"In the case of In re Reiser's Estate, 57 Utah
434, 195 P. 317, the jurisdiction of the district court
in a probate proceeding was challenged by the administratrix of an estate, who claimed that the matter in controversy had not been theretofore adjudicated ...

* * * *

"In the course of the opinion, the court, at page
441 (195 P. 320) says:
'Without denying the power of the district court
to hear and determine a question of this kind, even
when exercising the powers of a probate court, we
feel compelled to hold that there should be some appropriate pleading to invoke the jurisdiction and
power of the court.'
"The court then quotes the following excerpt
from In re Tripp's Estate, 51 Utah, 359, 170 P. 975:

* * * *

'There seems to be no reason, under our Constitution and laws, why a district court in a probate
proceeding may not when necessary to a due administration of an estate exercise powers which ordinarily pertain to equity jurisdiction so that the business
may proceed without interruption or unnecessary
delay.'
"While the identical question presented here has
not been heretofore determined by this court, it must
be conceded from the legislation and decisions to
which we have referred that the tendency is in the
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direction of disregarding mere technical distinction'
relating to the powers of a district court when exer~
cising jurisdiction in probate proceedings.
" ... The court, has thus far found no substantial
reasons for holding that the district courts, in the
exercise of probate powers, may not determine such
questions as they arise during the course of administration. It is held, however, that the pleadings in
such cases must be such as to invoke the jurisdiction
of the court. Section 7873, supra, of the Probate Code
contemplates recasting the pleadings when necessary
for the trial of such questions as arise under section
7872.

* * *

" ... it is our opinion that it was the manifest
intention of the legislature, in enacting the Probate
Code, to simplify our judicial procedure so as to avoid
unnecessary circuity of actions in administering the
estates of decedents.
"The judgment is therefore reversed ... Appellant to recover costs.
"GIDEON, C. J., and FRICK, J. concur.
"CHERRY, J. I. concur in the result. The doctrine that claims for services rendered in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, at the
instance and request of administrators, are merely
claims against the administrator individually, and
cannot be made charges upon the estate of the deceased except indirectly through the administrator,
is an artificial doctrine, resting on no substantial
basis. Its practical application often results in dela!"
circuity of action, uncertainty, and injustice. Ma?Y
courts have rejected it .... I think the doctrine inconsistent with the Probate Code of this state. Comp.
Laws Utah 1917, §§ 7643, 7644 and 7666, very clearly
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imply that expenses of administration are not only
charges but preferred charges against the estate. The
matter of the lien asserted by petitioner is immaterial. If the petitioner has a claim at all against the
estate, it is for expenses of administration, which,
by the statute, has preference in the order of payment.
" ... There is very respectable authority for the
proposition that claims for attorney's fees for services performed in the course of administration may
be allowed by the probate court and ordered paid
directly to the attorney performing the service. In
addition to Hazlett v. Moore, 89 Neb. 372, 131 N.W.
589, cited in the majority opinion, see U.S.P. & G. Co.
v. People, 44 Colo. 557, 98 P. 828; People v. El Paso
Co. Ct., 74 Colo. 123, 219 P. 215; in re McLure's
Estate, 68 Mont. 556, 220 P. 527; Knight v. Hamaker, 40 Or. 424, 67 P. 107. In California, the proceeding is authorized by statute. Kerr's Cyc. Codes, Cal.
1616. This form of proceedings is simple, direct, and
sensible, and ought to have judicial sanction, especially since this court is not committed to the contrary.
This does not mean that the scope of probate proceedings may be enlarged to include the adjudication
of disputes relating to contracts with or claims
against the deceased or to controversies over the title
or possession of estate property. Because the matter
in hand relates to expenses of administration, a subject directly connected with and arising out of the
proceedings over which the probate court has control, and which it must adjudicate in any event with
the administrator, it becomes a peculiar and appropriate subject of cognizance in the probate proceedings, for which reasons I approve the reversal of the
judgment.
"STRAUP, J., concurs in the views expressed
by CHERRY, J."
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This court reaffirmed its rationale in Agee's Estate and
followed it in Rice's Estate, 111 U. 428, 182 P.2d
111
(1947).
This author prefers the position of Justices Straub and
Cherry in Agee's Estate, supra. Whether this court follows
the majority or the concurring opinion in that case, it is
clear from the record that the Third Judicial District Court• 8
probate division was a court of competent jurisdiction. Its
jurisdiction was invoked by John Elwood Dennett'R petition
for attorney's fees answered by admissions and denials by
First Security Bank and by the appearance of the defendant
'
Jacob R. Green II at the hearing on Mr. Dennett's claim
wherein he objected to Dennett's petition and consented to
submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate the issue after being thoroughly advised by the court
that he could have a continuance for the purposes of obtaining legal counsel. (R-157-183)
All of the elements of res judicata existed within the
proceedings on Mr. Dennett's petition for attorney's fees in
the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I. The plaintiff's
claim in his complaint in the case at bar is res judicata.
POINT II
THE PAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM COLLATER·
ALLY ATTACKING THE DECREE OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, WHEREIN HE
IS AWARDED FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES
RENDERED TO DEFENDANTS

1
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1

The decree of the District Court, probate division, in
the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I is not subject to
collateral attack. The controlling case decided by this court
is Erickson v. McCullough, 91 U. 159, 63 P.2d 595, 109
A.L.lL 332 ( 1937). In that case the plaintiff, Erickson, a
minor, by his guardian ad litem, Tanner, took action against
Salt Lake attorneys, McCullough & Callister. Said attorneys
had been employed by the minor's mother to prosecute a
claim for the minor against Arctic Ice Company. The guardian ad Jitem in the case against the ice company was the
mother. After tentative settlement of the claim with the defendant, Arctic Ice Company, the mother petitioned for
letters of guardianship and authority as general guardian to
pay attorneys fees to McCullough & Callister in the sum of
i3,708.00. The plaintiff, Erickson, by his guardian ad litem,
Tanner, sought to cancel the allowance of attorneys fees in
the guardianship proceeding and sought judgment against
the attorneys for the amount of fees they had received or
attorneys fees which had been allowed. Plaintiff contended
that the attorneys fees were excessive, illegal, inequitable
and unconscionable. The defendant's attorneys, McCullough
&Callister, demurred to the plaintiff's complaint. This court
held that the award of attorneys fees in guardianship and
probate matters is not subject to collateral attack except for
Jurisdictional reasons. The court said :
"Appellant, however, further submits questions
relating to the contract for attorneys' fees and the
power of the guardian ad litem to bind the infant.
The court having acquired jurisdiction of the person
and estate of the minor, these questions become collateral and may be successfully urged in a collateral
attack only if the order making the appointment of
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the guardian of the minor is void for want of ju ·.
diction. It is contended that the probate court mr~.
an order allowing an attorneys' fee without hear~ e
or t~king any evidence relative to the value of~~!
services. The probate court having ecquired jurisdiction of a cause, its orders and judgments are nre.
sumed to be based upon evidence, stipulations or ~ro.
ceedings sufficient to support such orders or judg.
men ts."
POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ANYTHING OTHER
THAN A REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEE FOR
SERVICES RENDERED WHICH HAS BEEN ADJUDICATED AND WHICH MUST BE RECOVERED
BY PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE
DECREE AWARDING HIM HIS FEE
It is elementary hornbook law that when a contract does
not contain an essential term such as the amount of compfn
sation for attorney's services and the attorney renders serr.
ices, the amount of compensation is implied. It is a reasm1•
able amount. 7 Am.Jur.2d §§ 235, 250, pp. 183, 187
In his complaint Mr. Dennett alleges :
'"While not discussed in terms of percentage3,
the (Mr. Dennett's) compensation was to be a rontingent compensation, ... "
No allegation appearing in the complaint of a defimte
term of compensation for legal services, the only basis L'l
compensation can be reasonableness. In the Estate of Jnrr'i'
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r r;reen I, the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, adjudicated what constitutes a
reasonable attorney's fee. Res Judicata pro veritate accipt-

•"

The defendants have tendered Mr. Dennett the fee the
District Court awarded to him. Even if defendants failed to
tender the fee to him, Mr. Dennett's recourse is not his action
in the case at bar but supplementary proceedings to the
decree. 75-9-27 U.C.A., 1953.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff is barred and es topped from any relief
upon his complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
L. RIDD LARSON
Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellants

